Abstract
Communication, culture and media studies are in relatively rude good health in Australia. Developing out of English, sociology and history, they have only been studied in a recognisably emergent disciplinary formation at a tertiary level since the 1970s. During that time, several surveys (Frow and Morris, 1993; Turner, 1993 Turner, , 1998 Wilson, 2006) point to a set of interrelated fields of inquiry that have emerged strongly over a generation and now occupy positions of consolidated popularity amongst students, maintaining their position as the most popular field of study in the broad humanities for much of the last decade. It is interesting to track the consistent growth of the discipline based on two earlier comprehensive studies in 1990 and 2000 (Molloy and Lennie, 1990; Putnis, 2000) . Looking at the contemporary situation based on official student enrolment data, while total public university domestic enrolments rose by 2 per cent over 2002-07, media and communications rose by 16 per cent. While it was the newer universities that developed the first wave of media and communications courses, more recently it has been the older, 'Group of Eight' universities that have supported the continued growth (with 78 per cent growth in numbers in the same period).
In his overview of 'The Media and Communications: Theoretical Traditions' for the standard Australian university textbook in the field, John Sinclair comments: 'Just as American film critics like to describe Australian films as "quirky" when they don't know how to fit them into their conventional categories, the term could also be applied to media and communication theory and research in Australia.' (Sinclair, 2010: 27) Some of this quirkiness comes from an arguably greater degree of openness to cross-disciplinary influence because close cousins huddle together administratively in a small academic market. There are also the strong cross-currents derived from the dominant critical as well as empirical traditions, which we can regard as the always-unstable blend of humanities and social sciences in the field. To these factors can be added a certain ingrained predilection toward the utilitarian or the instrumental that can be parsed both culturally and institutionally. 1 Sinclair concludes his discussion of that which is 'uniquely Australian' by focusing on the policy orientation in the field:
The arrival of the 'policy moment' has turned out to be a durable and effective way of channelling academic theory and research into policy analysis and critique, and real-world engagement with the media and communication industries. The focus on cultural and media policy has proved a useful discipline in saving cultural studies from its tendency towards abstraction and critique for its own sake. At the same time, it has confronted political economy with the cultural complexities with which the approach must deal. (2010: 28) This significance of this strand of the field is confirmed in analyses of research accomplishment. A recent analysis conducted by the Australian Research Council of Research in the 'Humanities and Creative Arts Discipline grouping in 2004' (ARC, 2004) found that the disciplines with the strongest international profile and distinctiveness of contribution internationally were principally philosophy; cultural, media and communication studies; and Asian studies. In this survey of international and national leaders in a range of humanities and creative arts disciplines, cultural studies -and within it cultural policy and creative industries research -consistently were featured as a distinctive and leading element of Australian research strengths.
My purpose in this article is to reflect on two Australian instances of the alignment of communication, culture and media research and scholarship with industry and policy, and the relations between them, with which I have been directly involved. Both have had an international provenance, but with a distinctive Australian contribution or origination. Both have been controversial because 'alignment' brings with it the possible loss of critical distance judged by some to be the sine qua non of the academic vocation.
The 1990s 'cultural policy debate' asked whether cultural studies may actually be detrimental to the formation of progressive cultural policy rather than being benignly irrelevant to it, or merely a 'handmaiden' of it. The controversies provoked by this and related positions (such as those of Tony Bennett, Colin Mercer and Ian Hunter) have reverberated to the present day. My arguments in the cultural policy debate were designed to assess academic work in the field against its claims to be a politically informed critical practice. I named the problem as cultural studies' tendency to under-estimate 'the positive role the state may play in shaping and supporting cultural activity that would otherwise not be viable in unregulated or minimally funded markets, a tendency to downplay the achievements of Australian cultural expression from within commercial and corporate environments, and minimal participation in the ongoing policy debates that are framing our cultural futures' (Cunningham, 2008 (Cunningham, [1993 : 204).
What, in retrospect, were the distinctive features, and the limitations, of this intervention in the discipline's interface with industry and policy? The cultural policy moment was essentially an intramural academic debate about the preparedness of the discipline for engagement with the policy apparatus. Or, as Ken Wark (1992: 677) acidly remarked, 'humanities intellectuals arguing about … humanities intellectuals, like a bad day on the Oprah Winfrey Show'. Second, the Archimedean point on which it was constructed was too narrow to balance its agenda. The essential argument was that a number of key pressure points in cultural and media policy needed to be defended qua cultural policy against the then dominant deregulatory waves in communications and media policy. The problem was that the core assumptions undergirding the argument -the self-evident value of the defence of the national culture against globalising (read American) influences -were being undermined.
Third, industry and social change wasn't driving the cultural policy moment. A defence of the legitimacy of cultural regulation was necessary to shore up the status quo, but new game-changers were on the horizon in industry, society and community that began to undermine the shape and structure of the regulatory settlement and 'regulation all around' (Emy, 1993) . In particular, the cultural policy debate was conducted largely before the advent of the World Wide Web and social media.
What transitioned me from a position of defending cultural regulation as the Archimedean point for the advancement of the field was the sense, first, that cultural activity at the margins of the mainstream was often a policy no-go area. Studying diasporic cultures underlined that small business commerce and citizen formation are stitched together, defying the doctrinaire divide between citizen and consumer that pervades our discipline field. They taught me about the prevalence and necessity of 'grey' markets for culture and information, which arise out of a direct demand under-serviced by broadcast and in most cases cable television and other established national and international provision. They illustrate dynamics of international circulation of creative content below the radar of cultural and communications policy, and tell a complicating story about the limits of the modernist dream of a common (broadcast and other) culture.
Second, the category of the creative industries, invented for adventitious purposes by the British government in the late 1990s, was a game-changing policy intervention placing media at the centre of a growth sector defined in a challenging but contestable way to include everything from the arts and antiques to the latest digital entertainment and design sectors. This posed a new object of study for the discipline, but this time constructed in such a way that the discipline could not address it in and of itself. The creative industries problematic opened broader vistas for communication, media and cultural study scholars, while also potentially linking their efforts to other than cultural policy bureaux, in particular to departments, portfolios and agendas that were not parked, as culture usually is, at the margins of the public policy mainstream. In particular, linking culture, media and communication to innovation policy, which I laid out for the first time in 2002 in a keynote address to the Australian and New Zealand Communication Association, promised to connect the field of culture to that field where new rationales for government action and intervention had taken shape.
By identifying an industry sector (the creative industries) that drew its core intellectual capital and human resource from the humanities and creative arts, and linking that industry cluster to the national innovation effort as an advance over a purely science-technology-engineering-mathematics (STEM)-based investment in national innovation, we laid the basis for a new formulation of the contemporary relevance of the humanities-arts-social sciences (HASS) discipline cluster, and of the centrality of our parts of the 'new' humanities -communications and media studies, new media and internet studies -to that formulation.
This opened up a new avenue for the social, cultural and economic applications of our discipline field. It allowed a case to be made for the nationally significant role of research into the content and creative industries and their contribution to national innovation, and also created a fresh rationale for cross-disciplinary alliances, and an interface with the sciences that went beyond mere 'handmaiden' status.
It resulted in what became a successful bid in 2004-05 for a nationally funded centre of excellence based on the need to identify gaps in national innovation systems -in part because of their hitherto exclusive focus in STEM disciplines and STEM-based industries -and the need to offer a coherent plan to address them. Innovation is far more than white lab coat science, and high-value service industries are where a large proportion of incremental and process innovation happens. While this had begun to be recognised for the social science-based sectors, it had yet to be persuasively made for the content and creative industries.
Certain national developments in public policy frameworks and programs have responded to these arguments. The recent major review of the national innovation system, resulting in the report Venturous Australia (Cutler, 2008) , brings Australian policy into the twenty-first century, balancing the claims of breakthrough science with those of process innovation at the level of the firm, thus laying a necessary basis for attention to small business innovation without prejudice as to its sectoral location. The Australian government now seeks to define science and research in an inclusive way, and many of its programs now explicitly encourage the HASS sector rather than explicitly or implicitly excluding it. And, apart from the aforementioned ARC Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries and Innovation, the creative industries as such have been recognised as an integral part of the knowledge-intensive small business sector with the establishment of the Creative Industries Innovation Centre (www.creativeinnovation.net.au) within Enterprise Connect, a national emerging industries innovation support network.
Both 'moments', as I said, have been controversial. I will conclude by sketching what could be seen as the three main lines of critique of such an alignment of communication, cultural and media research and scholarship with industry and policy: its untoward proximity to tenets of the dominant neo-liberal ideology; the evacuation of cultural value by the economic; and the possible loss of the critical vocation of the humanities scholar.
The innovation framework is usually regarded in the critical arts and humanities as another manifestation of the widespread governance paradigm of neo-liberalism. I would contest this. Innovation systems approaches are a relatively recent public policy framework, which has really only been in place for a couple of decades. And they are contested precisely because they undercut the logics of neo-liberal rationales for small government, deregulation and getting out of the way of the operations of markets. Innovation policy has been made in a context in which Western governments have reintroduced themselves to an active interventionary role in a number of areas that they spent a couple of decades getting out of in the 1970s and 1980s, in the post-stagflation era and the end of the Keynesian settlement.
The innovation policy framework is a value-driven orientation to productivity and, ultimately, quality of life, rather than merely a cost-efficiency driver for intervention. In that sense, it is in contrast to micro-economic rationales for change and reform -which were the mantra of Western governments' strategy into the late 1980s and early 1990s. Innovation frameworks do represent a historic shift in the ways in which government has thought of an appropriate role for intervention. This has led to a disposition to focus on emerging industries that exhibit innovation and R&D intensity, upskilling and education of the population, and a focus on universalising the benefits of connectivity through mass ICT literacy upgrades -all fundamentally progressive moves by the state, the benefits of which could be seen by any communication and media scholar. The role of governments in innovation systems is to map and help coordinate the system, facilitate linkages where they are inadequate or bring them in to existence where they don't exist. Regarding innovation, they must attend to evidence of system failure, not only market failure. The litmus test is that innovation investments are regularly viewed askance by Treasury officials because they are regarded as industry policy by another name and therefore as highly suspect.
For the many critics of the creative industries concept (e.g. Garnham, 2005; Miller, 2008; Oakley, 2009; O'Connor, 2009) , it is seen as a kind of Trojan horse, suborning the integrity of the case for support for culture through an untoward economism. It could, however, be viewed as opening up the hitherto ossified relation between economics and culture, a relationship no longer to be limited to questions of the arts and market failure (cultural economics), or of rationales for cultural regulation. Instead, there is a focus on the role of media, culture and communications in generating change and growth in what Schumpeter called the capitalist 'engine'. Engaging with the heterodox school of evolutionary economics (the intellectual source of much innovation thinking) can, perhaps ironically, bring us back to many animating questions of our field -what are the genuine advances in the communications and media sectors (including aesthetic advances), how would we measure them, and what has been their impact? These are indeed questions of cultural value, from which the debates have rarely veered.
Indeed, the appropriate relations between the economic and the cultural might best be traced as the evolution of cultural forms as social and industrial norms themselves evolve. From the mid-twentieth century, the state developed a role that involved addressing market failure by asserting the ameliorating and elevating role of the arts (the values expressed in the arts can never, finally, be reconciled with those of the market). It then engaged in regulation and support of what came to be dubbed the 'cultural' industries (popular cultural value was significantly embodied in the products and services of these industries, but they needed protection from the market's levelling of cultural value). Then the high relative growth in the creative sector led to 'creative industry' development strategies based on the healthiness of traditional macroeconomic (GDP, employment, export growth) and microeconomic (enterprise sustainability) indicators, and the beginnings of the mainstreaming of cultural activity in the knowledge-intensive services economy. The crisis in mass media business models and the rapid co-evolution of the market and household sectors (the pro-am revolution, social network markets, creativity as a social technology, contemporary innovation policy focused on creative human capital) suggests that addressing future potential sources of value creation and the nature and structure of future markets will have much to do with emergent cultural resources at the population level.
Each of these models of the relation of the cultural to the economic accretes and overlays the others in the contemporary situation. Each has an account of cultural value. Each stood in a critical relation to the dominant formations of its time, and each had -and has -a potentially emancipatory function.
Finally, there is the matter of the critical vocation of the humanities scholar. It seems to me to be a matter of core pedagogical ethics to refine critical stances in our field to take account of vocational aspirations, workplace trends and the broader structure of the economy in which students will be seeking career opportunities. Engaging students in the nature of work and labour, involving the exploration of the notion of the portfolio career, self-employment and the expected multiplicity of career directions in any one person's working life -especially in these fields -should be core business. The conditions of precarious labour, a growing focus of research in critical communication studies that forms the basis of much of the critique of the creative industries idea, needs to be addressed as a current reality, neither to be celebrated nor critiqued tout court. I would argue that building into our curricula the analytical and practical skills (including 'left' knowledge and skills about rights at work and critical knowledge of corporate citizenship or lack of it, for example, as well as 'right' knowledge and confidence of global 'creative class' opportunities) is a self-evidently necessary balance between critique and vocational realism.
Note

1
Thus, Andrew Milner (1991) : 'Australia has been catapulted towards post-industrialism at a speed possible only in a society that had never fully industrialised; towards consumerism in a fashion barely imaginable in historically less affluent societies; towards an aesthetic populism unresisted by any indigenous experience of a seriously adversarial high culture; towards an integration into multinational late capitalism easily facilitated by longstanding pre-existing patterns of economic dependence, towards a sense of 'being 'after', and of being post-European, entirely apposite to a colony of European settlement suddenly set adrift, in intellectually and imaginatively uncharted Asian waters, by the precipitous decline of a distant Empire.' Institutionally, there has been a continuing debate on Australian universities' history being one of closer engagement with, and practical servicing of, the social and professional education needs of a relatively young settler society, in contrast to the longer traditions of 'setting apart' seen in older societies with much longer higher education traditions (see, for example, Smith, 1991 and more recently Marginson and Considine, 2000) .
